The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping 1987-1997

The end of the Cold War initiated major changes in the global security environment that the United States could not ignore. These changes affected security requirements, forces, and missions that had guided the country since the end of World War II. Another "New Look" was needed, one that recognized the uncertainty inherent in the absence of a single rival power. Domestic pressures for a "peace dividend" provided additional impetus for a comprehensive restructuring of the nation's defenses. Army leaders responded almost immediately, agreeing that a more flexible, more technology-capable ground force was needed, one able to react to a much broader variety of threats and contingencies. But deciding how that goal could be best realized would prove illusive. Dr. Mark Sherry's The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987-1997, examines this tumultuous period in depth. The author relates how the efforts of Army leaders to develop options for change were soon overtaken by actions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Army size, structure, and missions. Strengthened by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act, the Joint Chiefs led the way, exerting an unprecedented degree of power in reshaping Defense Department policies and postures. Sherry first considers the Army's studies and recommendations before tackling the higher level initiatives that followed, culminating in the Bottom-up Review and finally the first Quadrennial Defense Review. These Defense Department studies quickly overshadowed all Army reshaping efforts and seized the initiative for defense transformation. One result was the reduction by 1997 of the Army's active duty strength by over one-third with few substantive changes in its missions or structure. Another was the greatly reduced size and authority of the Army Staff and Secretariat, undermining their ability to define the size, shape, and nature of the ground forces that they were expected to provide to the combatant commanders. Ten years later, these measures remain controversial. Whether the Army's ground forces are large enough and properly structured to address the full range of strategic requirements is still a question mark. So, too, is the size and shape of its generating base-its schools, installations, and administrative commands-and the Pentagon-based "Army Command Post" that oversees the entire effort. This work is thus not intended to end what is likely to be a continuing debate over national strategy and how best to implement it, especially from the viewpoint of land forces and the senior service. Instead, The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping is meant to clarify that debate and better prepare those who are taking part in it and who in the end will determine the future of the Army, the soldiers, and their ability to accomplish the tasks they are assigned to fulfill.