The Limits of Free Will
and criminology, moral psychology, theology, and, more recently, neuroscience. These articles were written and published over a period of three decades, although most have appeared in the past decade. Among the topics covered: the challenge of skepticism; moral sentiment and moral capacity;
necessity and the metaphysics of causation; practical reason; free will and art; fatalism and the limits of agency; moral luck, and our metaphysical attitudes of optimism and pessimism. Some essays are primarily critical in character, presenting critiques and commentary on major works or contributions in the contemporary scene. Others are mainly constructive, aiming to develop and articulate a distinctive account of compatibilism. The general theory advanced by Russell, which he
describes as a form of "critical compatibilism", rejects any form of unqualified or radical skepticism; but it also insists that a plausible compatibilism has significant and substantive implications about the limits of agency and argues that this licenses a metaphysical attitude of (modest)
pessimism on this topic. While each essay is self-standing, there is nevertheless a core set of themes and issues that unite and link them together. The collection is arranged and organized in a format that enables the reader to appreciate and recognize these links and core themes.
| Publisher Name | Oxford University Press USA |
|---|---|
| Author Name | Hagendorf, Col |
| Format | Audio |
| Bisac Subject Major | PHI |
| Language | NG |
| Isbn 10 | 0190627603 |
| Isbn 13 | 9780190627607 |
| Target Age Group | min:NA, max:NA |
| Dimensions | 00.93" H x 00.06" L x 20.00" W |
| Page Count | 312 |
Paul Russell, Professor in Philosophy, University of British Columbia and Lund University. Paul Russell is Professor in Philosophy at the University of British Columbia and Lund University. His publications include Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1995); The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion
(Oxford University Press, 2008); and editor of The Philosophy of Free Will (Oxford University, 2013).
