Applying Lessons of Trust in Future Command Arrangements

This monograph elucidates lessons of trust learned through the study of historical command relationships between soldier and airman. The purpose of this monograph is to highlight the need to apply the lessons learned from these case studies in today's operating environment. To accomplish this purpose, the work examines three historical case studies: Generals Bradley and Quesada in WWII, Generals Schwarzkopf and Horner in Operation Desert Storm, and Generals Clark and Short in Operation Allied Force. By illustrating differing airpower conceptualizations in these case studies, this monograph examines efforts to establish solid relationships built on trust and competence needed to overcome these conceptual differences to accomplish the mission. Beginning with a review of early airpower theory and concepts, the first case study examines both sides of competing airpower concepts as well as the individual officers' thoughts on the employment of airpower. The chapter then highlights the existing command structure these officers operated within, specifically noting the command arrangements in place and where each officer stood in this chain of command in relation to his counterpart. The second case study begins with a brief glimpse into the importance and evolution of AirLand Battle doctrine, focusing on its impact on airpower conceptualization. The chapter then examines the trust General Schwarzkopf had for General Horner, and how Horner fostered that trust through competence. The last relationship examined is an example of a lack of trust between airman and soldier, and the impact it had on future airpower conceptualization. The final chapter begins by identifying the contextual differences in today's operating environment and then highlights command and control nodes where the airman and soldier interact. The monograph then elucidates conclusions drawn from studying the selected command relationships. The conclusions focus on the contextual commonalities and differences within the study, and clearly demonstrate the need for trust based on competence in today's operating environment. By showing shortcomings in airpower expertise available to the decision maker and highlighting where airmen and soldiers interact, opportunities to apply the lessons learned become clear. This monograph concludes by showing that command and control structures that foster trust through competence can bridge the gap created by conceptual differences in airpower application. Command structures that bring airpower expertise to the supported commander allow for a synergistic application of the tools at the disposal of the commander.