Afghan Right Linking a Stable Economic and Industrial Base to a Self Sustaining ANA Logistics Adjusted to Afghan Culture

The ultimate success of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission in Afghanistan relies on transitioning responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces, primarily the Afghan National Army. The US and NATO have built an ANA of 134,000 personnel to assume the security mission. However, the ANA requires a logistical system that is capable of sustaining it after the departure of Coalition forces by 2014. The key elements of a self-sustaining ANA are a strong economic and industrial base linked to a logistical system that leverages the stronger elements of Afghan culture. The ANA logistical system must project sustainment from the national depots to the tactical units fighting insurgents in the rural areas. Afghan culture is described using Geert Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The Afghan Ministry of Defense has decreed the establishment of a western style demand-supported distribution-based logistical system. The establishment of this system is recognized as a cultural challenge since the western system relies on the principles of anticipation, responsiveness, and economy that clash with the stronger aspects of Afghan culture. Next, the monograph describes the current state of ANA logistical system and recommended adjustment in terms of a regionally focused, modified structure to reduce delays, and development of an Installation Management Agency-like garrison structure. The ANA logistical system requires a stable economic and industrial base to provide materiel and funding for its facilities throughout the country. Afghanistan published a National Development Strategy in 2008 that represents an Afghan lead on a holistic approach to reaching the government's development objectives. Comparing the US mission to Greece in 1947 to the current US operation in Afghanistan illustrates techniques for building an economic and industrial base that can generate the revenues required to sustain the ANA in the post coalition era. This comparison also identifies some of the obstacles to establishing the revenue base to include the lack of an Afghan lead on developmental projects, the complexity of regional relationships with India, Pakistan, China, and Iran, poor security conditions, and the Afghan cultural connection of wealth to power.